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INTRODUCTION
Empirical studies of judicial behavior are becoming
increasingly common and sophisticated.1 These studies typically
draw upon large databases of opinions and employ quantitative
analytic techniques in an attempt to measure the influence of
various factors in judicial decision-making.2 A focus of particular
attention in many of these studies is the role played by political
ideology. For example, Cass Sunstein and several colleagues
examine this issue at length in a 2006 book aptly entitled Are Judges
Political?3 Like many other scholars, Sunstein and his coauthors find
that political ideology does indeed have an effect on judicial
decisions—at least in some cases, and at least to some degree.4
Other empirical studies have concentrated their attention on the
influence of ideology in specific doctrinal areas. Gregory Sisk and
Michael Heise have published a series of articles focusing on
religious liberty cases in the federal courts and have reported a
range of results. While Sisk and Heise find that political ideology
does not play a significant explanatory role in Free Exercise Clause

1. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2017 (2016) (discussing evolution of theoretical and empirical studies of judicial
decision-making in various disciplines); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 874
(2008) (“Within just a few short years, empirical study of the law in general, and in particular
of the courts, has risen to a level of prominence in American law schools.”).
2. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (2007)
(analyzing some 18,000 federal appellate cases from 1925 to 1992); LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (applying regression and correlation analysis
to datasets of decisions from all levels of federal judiciary).
3. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE
JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
4. Id. at 148–49 (finding “significant splits between Republican and Democratic
appointees on the great legal issues of the day” overall, while also finding that “in some
controversial areas, the political affiliation of the appointing president is not correlated with
judicial votes”); see also EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 385 (“[I]deology influences judicial
decisions at all levels of the federal judiciary . . . [but] it does not extinguish the influence of
conventional principles of judicial decision-making . . . .”); CROSS, supra note 2, at 7 (“Judges
appointed by more conservative presidents consistently produce more conservative
opinions on the bench . . . [but] this effect varies considerably over time and by the type of
case under review.”).

294

006.REYES_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

293

8/13/19 9:54 AM

Religion in Judicial Decision-Making

cases,5 they find that “[t]he powerful role of political factors . . .
appears undeniable and substantial” in Establishment Clause
cases.6 Similarly, in the context of education, Sisk and Heise
conclude that “Republican-appointed judges were more likely than
their Democratic-appointed counterparts to reach a pro-religion
decision in school cases.”7
There is thus a significant body of existing scholarly literature
exploring the influence of ideology on judicial decision-making in
general and on religion cases in particular. The present Article
makes a novel contribution to that literature by exploring a
related but distinct issue. Rather than analyzing religion as a
category of cases that is subject to ideological influence, we focus
on religion as a category of ideology that has the potential to exert
its own influence.
Several key elements distinguish our approach. First, we seek
to measure the role of religion in a broad range of cases in which
various forms of ideological influence might be expected to
manifest themselves. In other words, we do not limit our
examination of religious influence to cases that present religious
liberty issues. Second, whereas some studies have included religion
among other variables when examining the role of political
ideology in decision-making,8 our emphasis is on the role of
religion as such. We accordingly offer a much more detailed
discussion of the relationship between religious identification and
outcomes, and the ways in which this relationship may differ with
respect to various religious denominations and traditions. Third,
rather than looking at the independent effects of different
ideological influences, we employ more complex econometric
techniques to understand how political ideology measured several
different ways may interact with religious ideology in influencing
voting behavior in specific types of cases. We therefore offer more
textured results of the complex relationships among political

5. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Free Exercise of Religion Before the Bench: Empirical
Evidence from the Federal Courts, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1371, 1374 (2013).
6. Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study
of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2012).
7. Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making: An
Empirical Perspective, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 185, 189 (2012).
8. See, e.g., Heise & Sisk, supra note 5; Sisk & Heise, supra note 6; Heise & Sisk, supra
note 7.
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ideology, religious identification, and different substantive areas of
the law. We are able to say more not only about the interactions
between political ideology and religion but about how they operate
differently in different substantive contexts, such as cases in which
fundamental moral values are at issue. Finally, while most previous
studies have employed comparison of means or regression with
only main effects, we marshal more sophisticated econometric and
visual methodologies to analyze and understand the empirical
patterns in the data. We are therefore able to provide more nuanced
and (hopefully) more transparent insight into the nature of the
effects of political ideology and religion on voting behavior of
judges.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I discusses the
motivation for studying the influence of religion on judicial
decision-making. Part II summarizes the data, and Part III explains
our methodology. Part IV discusses the results of our analysis. Our
main finding is that in cases in which fundamental moral values9
are at stake, and almost exclusively in those cases, both religion and
political ideology matter—and they matter differently for different
religious groups. In these moral values cases, a divergence in
behavior arises in which Protestant judges seem to be voting
liberally or conservatively in line with their political ideology,
while Catholic judges seem to be voting relatively conservatively
regardless of their political ideology. The Article concludes with
some observations about the possible implications of our findings
for future nomination debates, confirmation hearings, and public
discourse about the judiciary.
I. WHY ANALYZE RELIGION?
Individualized illustrations of the influence of religion on
judicial behavior can occasionally be found in case law or media
reports. Perhaps most famously, the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals heard a case in which a former chief justice of the Alabama
Supreme Court placed a two-and-a-half ton Ten Commandments
9. Moral values cases include those involving abortion, obscenity, gay and lesbian
rights, and capital punishment. We include these kinds of cases because of the frequency
with which they are cast in moral or religious terms in public discourse. For further
discussion of case categories, see infra Section II.A.
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monument in the rotunda of the state judicial building.10 In holding
that the display violated the Establishment Clause, the court
indicated that the justice had installed the monument “in order to
remind all Alabama citizens of . . . his belief in the sovereignty of
the Judeo-Christian God over both the state and the church.”11
Another federal appellate case involved a North Carolina state
judge who began morning sessions of court by reciting a prayer
aloud.12 More recently, a state court judge in Texas reportedly
asked jurors to return a verdict of not guilty, explaining that “when
God tells me I gotta do something, I gotta do it.”13
But while cases like these may attract public attention, they do
not provide the primary motivation for the instant analysis. Such
explicit invocations of religion by judges acting in an official
capacity are notable in part because they are rare; few serious
observers would regard them as representative of larger trends in
judicial behavior. Rather, our motivation arises out of broader
discussions in the literature about more subtle influences of religion
in judicial decision-making—especially in cases implicating
fundamental rights and moral values, or in which the law is unclear
or unsettled.
Some have argued that judges should be able to rely on
religious reasoning to the same extent that they are able to rely on
other forms of moral reasoning when deciding such cases,14 while
others have maintained that judges should instead draw upon

10. Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
11. Id.
12. North Carolina Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145,

1146–47, 1152 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the prayer at issue violated the
Establishment Clause).
13. Ryan Autullo, Texas Judge Interrupts Jury, Says God Told Him Defendant Is Not Guilty,
STATESMAN (Jan. 20, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.statesman.com/news/20180120/Texas
-judge-interrupts-jury-says-god-told-him-defendant-is-not-guilty.
14. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 102–04 (1997) (when making a choice about “underdeterminate” legal
materials, judges may rely upon a religious premise if a plausible secular premise also
supports the choice); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
932, 943 (1989) (“[I]f religious conviction plays a role at all, it would enter into the deliberative
process, but not the process of justification . . . . [Judges] might make decisions on the basis
of moral conviction, but they must justify them in terms of the received norms of judging.”).
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“public reasons” or commonly held political premises and values.15
Popular and academic interest in issues of this sort became
particularly pronounced with the emergence of a Roman Catholic
majority on the U.S. Supreme Court in 2006.16 A number of scholars
addressed questions about the potential relationship between
Catholic doctrine and judicial decision-making, with several
articles emphasizing the paucity of explicit church teaching on the
judicial role and on constitutional interpretation.17 But another
article argued that Catholic teaching has long maintained that
public actors have an obligation to seek conformity between moral
law and civil law when fundamental rights are at issue;18 the article
further argued that judges often play a sufficiently robust
lawmaking role to be included in this teaching.19 Catholic doctrine
may thus be interpreted to imply that in at least some
circumstances, “[t]he Supreme Court’s judgment about the
application of the Constitution should . . . be guided by the
principles of the moral law.”20
Yet even if religious teachings do imply that certain cases
should be decided in certain ways, it cannot be assumed that
15. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 141–49
(1995) ([T]he basic reason for preferring some premises and ways of reasoning over other is
that they are shared in our political culture . . . . [S]o I believe reliance on some kinds of moral
and political philosophy is easier to justify for judges than reliance on their own religious
beliefs.”); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 213–16 (1993) (arguing that public actors and
supreme court judges in particular should justify decisions in terms of “the ideals and
principles expressed by society’s conception of political justice”).
16. See, e.g., René Reyes, The Supreme Court’s Catholic Majority: Doctrine, Discretion, and
Judicial Decision-Making, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 649 (2011); William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious
Faith and Judicial Duty of an American Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2006).
17. See Scott C. Idleman, Private Conscience, Public Duties: The Unavoidable Conflicts
Facing a Catholic Justice, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 312, 315 (2006) (“[T]here are few if any
authoritative church documents that speak directly to, or clearly about, a judge’s specific
obligations.”); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Catholics in Public Life: Judges, Legislators, and Voters, 46
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 211, 229 (2007) (“There is no official Church teaching that defines what
the U.S. Constitution means. Indeed, such a question is beyond the competence of the
Church’s teaching office.”).
18. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 653–62 (reviewing Catholic teaching on law, morality,
and public life).
19. Id. at 662–73 (considering applicability of Catholic teaching to judges).
20. William J. Levada, Theological Reflections on Catholics in Political Life and the Reception
of Holy Communion, U.S. CONF. CATH. BISHOPS (June 13, 2004), http://www.usccb.org/issues
-and-action/faithful-citizenship/church-teaching/theological-reflections-tf-bishops-politi
cians-2004-06-13.cfm; see also Reyes, supra note 16, at 667–68 (discussing Levada’s argument);
Kalscheur, supra note 17, at 229 n.48 (discussing same).
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religious judges will necessarily act in accordance with those
teachings.21 Nor have exchanges between Senators and judicial
nominees on the subject of religious influences on judging been
particularly illuminating. In response to questions about separation
of church and state during his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice
John Roberts stated, “my faith and my religious beliefs do not play
a role in judging. When it comes to judging, I look to the law books
and always have.”22 In a similar vein, Justice Samuel Alito
answered a query about the role of religion and morality in judging
by explaining that “my obligation as a judge is to interpret and
apply the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and not
my personal religious beliefs or any personal moral beliefs that I
have, and there is nothing about my religious beliefs that interferes
with my doing that.“23 Such responses appear to be in keeping
with the general trend among recent nominees of revealing very
little about the substance of their judicial philosophies, and of
portraying the decision-making process as the application of “law
all the way down.”24
In sum, both the academic literature and the judicial
confirmation process have raised ample questions about the role
that religion should play in judicial decision-making. No doubt
such questions will persist at the level of theory and politics for
years to come. The aim of this Article is to move beyond these
jurisprudential and theoretical debates and to provide a rigorous
empirical assessment of some of the issues they raise. Thus, instead
of reflecting on what judges ought to do or speculating about what
21. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 680–81 (noting diversity of jurisprudential approaches
among Catholic judges and emphasizing limited utility of Catholic self-identification as a
predictor of judicial behavior); see also John T. Noonan, Jr., The Religion of the Justice: Does It
Affect Constitutional Decision Making?, 42 TULSA L. REV. 761, 768 (2013) (“Religion . . . does not
regularly predict how a judge will vote on a constitutional question. It does not furnish an
explanation of how the judge voted. It does not regularly distinguish the judge from
colleagues who do not share his religious beliefs.”).
22. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 227 (2005).
23. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 566–67 (2006).
24. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2010); see also Sisk
& Heise, supra note 6, at 1202–04 (discussing Justice Kagan’s statement).

299

006.REYES_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

8/13/19 9:54 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2019

they might do when deciding cases that leave open a role for
religious or moral influences, we look at what judges actually do.
Throughout our analysis, Catholicism and Catholic judges
occasionally receive particular attention. This is so for a few
reasons. For one, the hierarchical structure of the Catholic Church
makes it possible to identify “official” or authoritative teaching
with greater clarity than is possible for many other religious
traditions.25 The Catholic Church’s long practice of bringing this
teaching to bear on questions relating to religion and public life
may also distinguish it from some other faith communities.26 In
addition, Catholic doctrine also highlights the fact that the
teachings of a single religious tradition may not all fit within a
single ideological category: some Catholic positions (such as
opposition to the death penalty) are thought to be more liberal,
while others (such as opposition to abortion) are regarded as more
conservative.27 This absence of complete congruence between
religious ideology and political ideology has the potential to help
isolate and measure the effect of each form of influence. To be sure,
some of these attributes are not unique to Catholicism, and we
apply our analysis to judges identified with a range of religions.
More details about the data and methods behind this analysis are
set forth in the next sections.
II. DATA
A. Case Data
The number of judges at different levels of the judiciary can
pose challenges for empirical analysis. At the state level, there are
some 30,000 trial and appellate judges—a number far too large to
25. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 656 n.34 (discussing hierarchy and teaching authority
of the Catholic Church); see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 85 (2d ed. 1997)
(“[T]he task of interpretation has been entrusted to the bishops in communion with the
successor of Peter, the Bishop of Rome.”).
26. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 678; see also Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047, 1071
(1990) (suggesting that with respect to issues like the relationship between natural law and
positive law, “[o]ne might be more likely to ask Roman Catholic nominees such questions
than, say, Lutherans, because the Catholic Church has historically insisted on the reality of
natural law in a way that the Lutheran community has not”).
27. See Reyes, supra note 16, at 680–81.
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manage for present purposes.28 At the other end of the spectrum,
there are only nine U.S. Supreme Court Justices on the bench at a
given time—a number much too small to provide for statistically
significant analysis. Any study must therefore make choices about
which judges and which opinions to focus upon. Following the
practice and relying on the data used by Sunstein, Schkade, Ellman,
and Sawicki,29 the analysis we present in this Article focuses on the
behavior of judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeal. The data consist
of a set of federal appellate cases with published opinions from
1980 to 2004. These cases were coded by Sunstein and his coauthors
for their study on the role of political ideology in judicial decisionmaking, and we follow the conventions established by those
authors.30 Decisions are coded as one for a liberal decision and zero
for a conservative decision. Given that judicial opinions do not
come pre-labeled as liberal or conservative, the process of coding
involves some degree of subjective judgment and imprecision.31
Nevertheless, most judgments should be fairly noncontroversial
—a judge’s vote counts as liberal, for example, “if it upholds an
affirmative action program . . . [or] strikes down a restriction on
sexually explicit speech.”32
Our primary level of observation will be a single judge in a
single case. Each federal appellate panel has three judges, so each
case appears three times in the dataset—i.e., once for each judge
—and includes that judge’s vote as well as the panel’s vote. Cases
are divided into small case categories by subject matter, as shown
in Table 1. We gather these specific case categories into three
broader categories: moral values cases, rights cases, and corporate
or other cases. Moral values cases include those concerning
abortion, constitutional and statutory challenges to obscenity
rulings, gay and lesbian rights, and capital punishment. Individual
rights cases include those concerning affirmative action, the

28. See RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., NCJ 242850,
SPECIAL REPORT: STATE COURT ORGANIZATION, 2011 (2013).
29. SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3.
30. Id. at 156–63 (providing a detailed explanation of the creation of the dataset and
the categorization of cases into these categories).
31. See id. at 18–19 (“Our methods for finding and assessing these cases . . . leave room
for errors and sometimes for a degree of discretion. We are confident, however, that we have
accurately identified the basic patterns of judicial votes.”).
32. Id. at 19.
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Americans with Disabilities Act, First Amendment challenges
regarding commercial advertising, sex discrimination and
harassment, and racial discrimination. The cases grouped into the
remaining corporate or other category are listed in Table 1. Like the
coding of cases as liberal or conservative, the classification of cases
into these categories involves subjective judgment and may leave
room for occasional disagreement. Nevertheless, we believe that
our categorizations are broadly accurate and provide a useful basis
for measuring ideological influence.
B. Overview of Case Data
Table 1 below shows a summary of the cases in our dataset. We
have a total of 3880 cases, of which 11% are moral values cases, 62%
are individual rights cases, and 27% are corporate or other cases.
Overall, in approximately half of the cases the panel came to a
liberal decision, but that percentage varies markedly across the
categories, from the lower end of 36% liberal decisions in moral
values cases and 41% in individual rights cases to the higher end of
69% in corporate or other cases.
We also see substantial heterogeneity within these groupings.
Of most interest is the heterogeneity within the moral values
category—about 65% of abortion cases resulted in a liberal decision,
while the percentage for the other moral values categories were
relatively consistent at around 28%. Lastly, we note that even with
nearly 4000 cases, we still have relatively small numbers in some of
these more specific case categories that are of particular interest.
This will constrain our ability to test subtle hypotheses about
judicial behavior, ideology, and religion.
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C. Judge Data
Our data on federal appellate judges is compiled from multiple
publicly available sources. The primary source is the Multi-User
Database on the Attributes of U.S. Appeals Court Judges, compiled by
Gary Zuk, Deborah Barrow, and Gerard Gryski of Auburn
University.33 Additional biographical information is drawn from
the Federal Judicial Center’s Biographical Directory of Article III
Federal Judges.34
We pay particular attention to measuring the religion and
political ideology of the judges. For religion, we use measures from
the Auburn database and supplement with additional information
on religious identification from Gregory Sisk and Michael Heise.35
We employ four broad religion categories: Protestant, Catholic, and
Jewish, with a fourth category encompassing other religious
identities or judges who are nonreligious. While somewhat more
detailed information is available on religion, the sample sizes in any

33. Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow & Gerard S. Gryski, Multi-User Database on the
Attributes of United States Appeals Court Judges, 1801–2000, NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA
(Feb. 3, 2009), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06796.v2. We also rely on a separate dataset
compiled by Zuk et al. to provide information for district court judges who may be sitting
by designation in a particular case. See Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow & Gerard S. Gryski,
Multi-User Database on the Attributes of United States District Court Judges, 1801–2000, NAT’L
ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA (Feb. 3, 2009), https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR04553.v1.
34. Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (last visited Feb. 19, 2019).
35. Sisk and Heise have made their data set available at http://courseweb.stthomas
.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.html. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1201 n.*. As
Professors Sisk and Heise explain, the religious identification data is based on “biographical
information and confirmation records for indications of religious affiliation, including
memberships, speeches, and writings. Thus, a judge coded as having no religious affiliation
is . . . someone who apparently has not belonged to or been active with any religious
organization.” Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1241. We consulted similar sources of
information to supply a religious identification value for a very small number of additional
judges who were not identified in either the Auburn or Sisk and Heise data sets. For example,
we categorized Judge Roger L. Gregory as “Protestant” based on biographical information
that appears on the University of Virginia School of Law News & Media website, and
categorized Judge Patricia M. Wald as “Catholic” based on information that appears in a New
York Times article. See Michael Marshall, Faith in Law Key to Black Struggle, Gregory Says, U.
VA. SCH. L. (Feb. 21, 2003), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/2003_spr/gregory.htm;
Linda Greenhouse, Public Lives: War Crimes Tribunal Appeals to Unconventional Judge, N.Y.
TIMES (July 12, 1999), https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/12/us/public-lives-war-crimestribunal-appeals-to-unconventional-judge.html.
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one cell become small enough that it is generally not feasible for us
to divide the religious groups more finely.
For ideology, we draw upon multiple measures from different
sources to best represent the breadth of the literature on judicial
ideology. Our primary measure is the Judicial Common Space
Score developed by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal,36 which
places judges in the same policy space as other political actors.37
This measure situates a judge in political ideology space by
proxying his or her ideology with the legislative record of the
appointing group of politicians (President and home-state Senators
from the President’s party, if any). We will refer to this measure
as political ideology based on the legislative record. This is the
canonical measure in the literature,38 and consequently the
primary measure of judicial ideology we will employ in our
empirical analyses.
The second measure we employ, developed by Adam Bonica
and Maya Sen, applies a similar “common space” methodology but
uses the political leaning of campaign finance contributions by the
judges themselves to place the judge in political ideology space.39
We will refer to this as political ideology based on the campaign
finance record. We will not use this measure directly in most of the
analyses discussed in this Article, but all of our empirical results
are robust to using this campaign finance measure.
Lastly, we will sparingly use an internal measure developed
from the case dataset above, which is the share of liberal votes for
the judge herself in the entire sample period in all case categories.

36. KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997).
37. Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Judicial
Common Space, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306 (2007) (“The starting point for our approach is
the NOMINATE Common Space scores that are the result of a scaling algorithm that takes a
set of issue scales [and] . . . provides an ideal point . . . in a two-dimensional Downsian issue
space.” (internal citations omitted)).
38. See Sisk & Heise, supra note 6, at 1222 (“Political scientists have come to regard
Common Space Scores as the state-of-the-art measure for the preferences of US Court of
Appeals judges.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
39. See Adam Bonica & Maya Sen, A Common-Space Scaling of the American Judiciary and
Legal Profession, 25 POL. ANALYSIS 114, 115 (2017) (using the judge’s campaign contributions
to place each individual judge “in a common space with other candidates and organizations
spanning local, state, and federal politics”).
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Due to its endogeneity,40 this measure has limited utility, but it
could be helpful in assessing whether a judge’s ideological stance
carries over across different categories of cases.

40. Ideally, a regression is able to establish a causal relationship between independent
variable X and dependent variable Y only when the independent variable X is exogenous.
Variable X is exogenous in a model regressing Y on X if variable X is not determined by
variable Y so that causality only runs in one direction, from X to Y. The ideology measure
based on legislative record of the appointing group of politicians can reasonably be assumed
to be credibly exogenous simply because it is temporally prior to the judge’s votes. In other
words, we do not think that the judge’s liberal vote in a case (our Y variable) affects the
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians (our X variable), so we are
reasonably able to ascribe the relationship between X and Y as a causal one from X to Y
—ideology so measured affects voting behavior. A similar, though somewhat weaker,
argument can be made for the ideology measure based on campaign finance contributions.
However, the judge ideology measure based on the judge’s liberal vote share is clearly not
exogenous precisely because it is based on the judge’s liberal vote share, which is the judge-specific
average of our Y variable. This endogeneity is partially alleviated by calculating the liberal vote
share on non moral values cases only and then using this only to predict voting in moral
values cases, but this strategy is effective only to the extent that a judge’s voting behavior
(and therefore his apparent ideology) is different across the different categories of cases.
Therefore, substantial endogeneity concerns remain for the ideology measure based on
liberal vote share, and this measure will consequently be used only sparingly. For further
discussion of endogeneity in general, see WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 242
–46 (2018).
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D. Overview of Judge Data
Table 2 tells us a good deal about the judges in our dataset.41
We see that they are representative of federal appellate judges, as
one would expect given that the Sunstein data include all cases
during an extended time period: their average age is 63, 90% are
white, and 85% are male. Note that in 7% of the judge-case
observations, other judges—primarily district court judges—are
sitting by designation. We do have demographic information for
41. Averages and shares will be calculated over the sample of case-judge observations,
i.e., each judge is counted as many times as they appear on a case.
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many of these other judges, especially if they were subsequently
elevated to a circuit court.
The second panel shows the religious distribution of the judges:
45% are Protestant, 27% are Catholic, and 16% are Jewish. The final
panel shows ideology measures. The common space measures
based on legislative record and campaign finance are scaled so that
-1 represents pure liberal, 0 is perfect moderate, and +1 represents
pure conservative. These measures lean slightly conservative, with
means that are just above 0. Our new measure based on each
judge’s voting history is rescaled similarly so that -1 represents
100% liberal votes and +1 represents 100% conservative votes. The
ideology measures exhibit substantial heterogeneity, as indicated
by the standard errors in the table and the fact that the interquartile
ranges for the three measures are 0.71, 0.65, and 0.38 respectively.
We also see that 60% of the judges sitting on these cases are
affiliated with the Republican Party.
Figure 1 below shows the relationships among the ideology
variables via a matrix of two-way scatterplots. While the three
ideology measures are all somewhat different in design, there are
clearly strong relationships between them: each measure is
positively correlated with the other two, indicating that they are to
some extent measuring some common ideological core. At the same
time, these measures are clearly not interchangeable: the pairwise
correlations are far from perfect, indicating that each one is
providing some different information.
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III. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
A. The Value of Observation
Our aim in this Article is to understand patterns of behavior
among judges sitting on federal appellate cases. It is important to
note that, beyond understanding, we also aim to explain these
patterns, and we do so by drawing upon the tools of applied
microeconomic analysis to complement traditional legal analysis.
But unlike most applied microeconomic analyses, our goal is to
explain by describing and understanding the patterns rather than
definitively validating a specific causal and mechanistic
explanation. Since establishing causality is usually so central to the
applied microeconomist’s endeavor, this distinction in goals and
methods merits some discussion.
Why do applied microeconomists usually aim to establish
causality? We do so because we want to be able to make “if-then”
statements, so that we know that if X happens, then Y will follow.
In the current investigation, however, we want to understand the
patterns in these data, to understand the behavioral patterns of
federal judges. We are not seeking to make statements about a
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possible world, but rather statements about the actual true world.
In addition to testing causal relationships, econometrics provides
us powerful tools for making sense of data, for observing in a
sophisticated and scientific manner.
Using econometric strategies to map out the relationships
between a judge’s characteristics and her jurisprudential behavior
does teach us something important about how different judges
behave. It is, however, observational, correlational, and not
necessarily causal. We can say that younger judges tend to do this,
and Catholic judges tend to do that. Those statements are
observations—systematic technical observations rather than casual
observations, but still observations. Putting a number of such
observations together carefully and systematically, we can produce
an empirical picture of actual judicial behavior. We can then
compare that empirical picture with a theoretical picture to see if
the two are aligned. In this way, we are testing the validity of a
theoretical model by comparing it to the empirical reality. That is
what we do in this Article.
B. A Model of Judicial Decision-Making
We employ a simple model of judicial decision-making in
which a judge’s characteristics—demographics, political ideology,
religion—influence his or her vote in a case. It is well established in
the literature that the characteristics of a judge and the
characteristics of the panel can affect the outcome of a federal
appellate case. Sunstein and his coauthors provide compelling
evidence that a judge’s vote is influenced by the political party of
the president who appointed them, and that a judge’s
ideological tendency is dampened or amplified when in the
ideological minority or majority.42 Other scholars have reported
similar findings.43
In this Article, we restrict our focus to the effects of a judge’s
individual characteristics rather than the effects of the panel’s
characteristics. This is primarily due to practical limitations in the
data. If a sample is split relatively evenly between two groups (e.g.,
Democrats and Republicans), random grouping of judges into

42. See SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 3, at 8–9.
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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panels will produce a range of panel compositions, with anywhere
from 0 to 3 judges of each party affiliation. In our case, the sample
is not split evenly, and it is split among four groups: 45% are
Protestant, 27% are Catholic, 16% are Jewish, and 12% are identified
as “other” or nonreligious. Even a sample of cases with nearly 4000
decisions will likely not generate enough combinations of different
panel compositions with different case categories.44 This means that
we simply do not have sufficient statistical power to test complex
hypotheses about the role of panel religious composition in
different categories of cases.
Our model of judicial decision-making, therefore, assumes that
judges’ decisions are based on the case in front of them and are also
influenced by their personal characteristics, with particular
attention to their political ideology and religious identity. We
formalize this model below.
C. Empirical Strategy
We analyze a set of federal appellate cases and aim to establish
the relationship between a judge’s characteristics and his or her
vote in a particular case. Our contribution to the growing literature
on judicial behavior is to pay particularly close attention to the
interacting roles of political ideology and religious identity. Hence,
our baseline specification investigates how political ideology and
religious identity predict the likelihood of a liberal vote, as follows:
Equation 1
𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒+, = 𝛼0 + 𝛼2 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, + 𝜌2 𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐, + 𝜌; 𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ,
+ 𝜌? 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛, + 𝑿, 𝜷 + 𝒀+ 𝝁 + 𝜀+, .

In this specification, the coefficient 𝛼2 represents the effect of
political ideology on the likelihood of a liberal vote. Our hypothesis
is that 𝛼2 will be negative: as a judge’s political ideology becomes

44. A panel composed of three judges of four different religious identities can be
composed in twenty different ways, calculated as a combination with replacement:
(OP?Q2)!
𝐶 I (4,3) =
= 20. With uneven probabilities of the different religions, the probabilities
?!(OQ2)!

of getting a panel with two or more judges of each religious group are, respectively, 23%,
6%, 2%, and 2% for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Other. The cell sizes would need to be
at least an order of magnitude larger to enable sufficient statistical power to test for panel
religion effects.
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more positive—i.e., more conservative—the likelihood that she
enters a liberal vote declines. Similarly, the 𝜌 coefficients represent
the effect of each religious identity on the likelihood of a political
vote. For example, if 𝜌; is positive and statistically significant, that
indicates that a Jewish judge is more likely to enter a liberal vote
relative to a Protestant judge (the omitted category). The final
components of the equation include a vector 𝑋, of judge
characteristics including sex, race, age, and years on the bench and
a vector 𝑌+ of case characteristics including indicator variables for
the decade of the case, the appeals circuit, and, in some
specifications, the specific case category. Here, judges are indexed
by 𝑗 and cases are indexed by 𝑐. The primary specification is
ordinary least squares (a linear probability model), though all
results are robust to running probit.45 Standard errors are clustered
at the case level.
Because we are particularly interested in the interactions
between political ideology and religious identity, we augment this
specification by adding these interactions:
Equation 2
𝐿𝑖𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒+, = 𝛼0 + 𝛼2 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦,
+ 𝜌2 𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐, + 𝜌; 𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ, + 𝜌? 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛,
+ 𝜃2 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, × 𝐶𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐,
+ 𝜃; 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, × 𝐽𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠ℎ,
+ 𝜃? 𝐼𝑑𝑒𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦, × 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛,
+ 𝑿, 𝜷 + 𝒀+ 𝝁 + 𝜀+, .

In this specification, the 𝜃 coefficients represent the religion-specific
effect of political ideology on the likelihood of a liberal vote. This
means that the full effect of ideology for a member of a religious

45. While a linear probability model often yields reasonably precise and accurate
results, a probit is the econometrically appropriate specification for a binary outcome
variable. The probit model allows for an underlying mathematical structure in which the
independent variables (religion, ideology, etc.) affect a latent propensity to vote liberally,
and subsequently a liberal vote arises if that latent propensity exceeds a certain threshold.
Probit models can, however, be more difficult to interpret (see infra note 58), so the researcher
must navigate a tradeoff between appropriateness and interpretability. We accomplish this
by reporting the results from linear probability models throughout the Article and then
providing evidence that the results from the corresponding probit model are qualitatively
and quantitatively similar. For further discussion of probit in general. See GREEN, supra note
40, at 728–36, 740–41.
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group is the sum of 𝛼2 and the 𝜃 for that group. Once again,
Protestant is the omitted religion category. This specification will
be run for the entire set of cases, and also for the large categories
(moral values, rights, or corporate/other) and in some cases for
small case categories (abortion, first amendment, etc.). The primary
ideology measure we will use throughout is judge ideology
based on the legislative record of the appointing politicians, and we
will also provide evidence on robustness to using alternate
ideology measures.
D. A Visual Methodology
As we proceed through these successive levels of inquiry, our
understanding of judicial decision-making will become
increasingly complex. It is apparent that, if we are to understand
the roles of ideology and religion in judicial decision-making, we
need to account for the independent and interacting effects of a
number of factors simultaneously: judge characteristics, ideology,
religion, as well as characteristics of the case. While one can do this
efficiently via regression analysis, the results can become so
intricate as to be nearly impenetrable. Since a complex model
appears to be the correct model for the empirical structure we are
observing, we proceed by running these fully saturated regressions
to maintain the necessary complexity, while displaying the results
in figures rather than in tables for maximum clarity.
In the interest of orienting the reader who might be less familiar
with graphical exposition of regression results, we would like to
turn our attention to Figure 2, which is an example of the type of
graph we will be using to understand our primary results. The
graph shows the predicted likelihood of liberal vote for judges of
various combinations of religion and ideology, based on regression
analysis following Equation 2. The title shows us that this analysis
has been done on the sample of moral values cases only. The
horizontal axis shows judge ideology, ranging from liberal (-1) to
conservative (+1), and in this case ideology is measured by the
campaign finance contributions of the judge. Each bold line with
shapes represents the prediction for a different religious group,
distinguished by the shapes and colors shown in the legend. The
thin dashed lines in matching colors represent statistical confidence
intervals around these predictions. The wide flat line shows, for
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reference purposes, the average likelihood of a liberal vote in the
entire sample being analyzed (in this case the average likelihood is
just shy of 0.4, or 40%).
How do we use a graph like this to understand judicial
behavior? We want to pay attention to the location of each line in
vertical space: a high position indicates a higher likelihood of a
liberal vote for a judge in that religious group. We also want to pay
attention to the slope of each line as we move across: a steep slope
indicates a larger role for ideology in the likelihood of a liberal vote
for a judge in that religious group.
Keeping this in mind, let us walk through the graph. Consider
the green line with triangles, representing Jewish judges. This line
is overall much higher than the others, particularly on the liberal

(left) side of the graph. Among judges with similarly liberal
political ideology, the Jewish judges are much more likely to lean
liberal in moral values cases.
The interaction of ideology and religion is best appreciated by
looking at the slopes of the lines. Consider the blue line with
squares, representing Protestant judges. Following this line from
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left to right, you are starting with the most politically liberal
Protestant judge and moving to the most politically conservative
Protestant judge. We see that the line slopes downward, indicating
that the likelihood of a liberal vote declines as a judge becomes
more politically conservative (as measured by his campaign finance
contributions). Next, consider the purple line with circles,
representing Catholic judges. Following this line from left to right,
we see that the line is relatively flat, indicating that political
ideology plays only a small role in determining the likelihood of a
liberal vote for Catholic judges in these moral values cases. Next,
consider the Jewish line again (green with triangles). Following this
line from left to right, we see that the line slopes downward very
steeply, indicating that political ideology appears to play a larger
role for Jewish judges. Lastly, we see that judges of other
religions or those who are nonreligious lean slightly liberal across
the ideological spectrum but that political ideology plays only a
small role.
Putting all of this together, the graph enables us to quickly
make sense of complex results. We now know that political
ideology matters in these moral values cases. Moreover, political
ideology appears to matter quite a lot for Jewish judges, some for
Protestant judges, and very little for Catholic judges or those of
other religious identities. We therefore know that religion matters,
since it seems to mediate the operation of ideology. Not only do the
lines have different vertical locations indicating a tendency of some
religious groups to lean more or less liberal, but they have different
slopes, indicating a different role of ideology within each religious
group. This visual methodology will be an essential tool for our
primary inquiry.
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IV. RESULTS
A. Surveying the Landscape
1. Ideology
We begin by surveying the landscape of judicial ideology and
its relationship to religious identification. As discussed above, there
are multiple measures of judicial ideology. To begin, we will
employ what we regard as the canonical measure, that based on the
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. Figure 3
shows a histogram of this measure of ideology for all of the judges
in the sample.46
Judicial ideology by this measure appears bimodal, with the
distribution showing two humps, one in the liberal (negative) range
46. Analysis of samples or subsamples of judges is performed on judge-case
observations. This means that a judge who appears in thirty different cases will be sampled
thirty times, whereas a judge who appears in only a single case (perhaps a district judge
sitting by designation) will be sampled just once. Given that the regression analysis will be
performed on the sample of judge-case observations, this is the appropriate strategy for
assessing the distribution and co-distribution of judicial characteristics for the sample of
judges whose decisions will be analyzed.
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from about -0.5 to 0.0, and one in the conservative (positive) range
from 0.0 to 0.7. Ideology is also somewhat right-leaning, with a
greater portion of the observations in the positive range, as
reflected in the means for this and other ideology measures shown
in Table 1. Lastly, we see that political ideology rarely extends
beyond the range of -0.5 to +0.5. In the analysis to follow, we will
use these two ideology locations as our benchmark political liberal
and political conservative.
2. Ideology and religion
Figure 4 below shows this distribution separately for the
primary religion categories. We see that the distribution for
Protestant judges is bimodal with a slight conservative lean (group
mean of +0.14). This distribution looks quite similar to the
distribution for all judges—hardly a surprising occurrence given
that nearly half of judges are Protestant. Catholic judges appear to
lean a bit more liberal, with more balanced shares to the right and
the left, and a group mean of 0.03. Jewish judges display a more
uneven distribution, with a trimodal distribution that shows
concentrations in very liberal, mildly conservative, and very
conservative areas, ultimately yielding a middling group mean of
0.08. Lastly, judges who identify with other religions or as
nonreligious (not shown) lean more liberal, with a mean of -0.09.
The most important takeaway here is that a judge’s ideology
and religion do not appear to be tightly related. While a naïve
hypothesis might be that religion could possibly be a decent
predictor of ideology, that hypothesis is false. To a great degree,
judicial ideology—at least by this measure—is reasonably
independent of religion. If our aim is to understand the roles of
ideology and religion in judicial decision-making—both the
independent roles and their potential interactions—such
independence is a necessary condition to perform the econometric
analysis. In sum, we do know that Protestant judges lean slightly
more conservative and that the distribution for Jewish judges is
trimodal, but more importantly we know that, for the most part,
each religion spans the ideology distribution.
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3. Ideology and voting
Given the extensive discussions in the literature regarding
various ideological measures, it is helpful to examine the
relationships among these ideological measures and also their
relationships to religious identity. Figure 5 plots the share of liberal
votes against political ideology as measured by the legislative
record of the appointing group of politicians. Judges affiliated as
Democrats are shown as blue circles, while judges affiliated as
Republicans are shown as red circles. We see that political ideology
does appear to be tightly connected to party affiliation (nearly all of
the Democrats are on the left while nearly all of the Republicans are
on the right). We also see that there is heterogeneity within parties
in share of liberal votes and political ideology, and that political
ideology and party are both somewhat predictive of voting
patterns. Lastly, this graph reinforces our sense that party
affiliation is nowhere near a perfect predictor of voting patterns:
there is a great deal of variation around the regression lines.
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4. Case types and voting
We saw earlier (in Table 1), that the share of liberal votes is also
quite heterogeneous across substantive areas. We can gain more
insight into this variation by plotting histograms of the judgecategory-specific share of liberal votes, which we do in Figure 6.
This shows, for example, that more than 20 judges in the sample
ruled conservatively on all of the moral values cases they saw,
while 12 of the judges ruled liberally on all of the moral values cases
they saw. In general, we see that the distributions for rights cases
(yellow) and corporate or other cases (blue) are approximately
normal distributions (bell curves), with the rights distribution
shifted to the left and the corporate/other distribution shifted to the
right. On the other hand, we see that the judges’ voting patterns on
the moral values cases (red) are spread much more widely
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throughout the entire range from 0 to 1, with substantial mass at
the extremes.47
We noted earlier that nominees to the federal bench often
downplay the role of extra-legal influences in judging. Chief Justice
Roberts likened judges to umpires whose task is not to make rules
but to apply them.48 For her part, Justice Elena Kagan indicated that
judicial decision-making was not about empathy or what was in a
judge’s heart, but about what the law requires.49 The distributions
in Figure 6 call these characterizations into question. If judges were
simply applying rules and laws and not relying on any other
influences, it is unlikely that we would see such substantial crossjudge heterogeneity in share of liberal votes. But we do see this
heterogeneity in moral values cases in particular, indicating that
when faced with moral questions judges are judging differently
from each other in ways that are judge-specific, suggesting that
they might be consulting something else other than “the law books”
alone.50 Whether that something else includes religious beliefs and
values remains to be determined by the analysis below.

47. Note that these histograms are overlaid and semitransparent so that combinations
of the primary colors (red, yellow, blue) indicate overlapping bars for those colors. For
example, the orange and yellow bars at 0.20 indicate that 7 judges voted liberally in 20% of
the rights cases they heard (the yellow bar extends up to 7), while 5 judges voted liberally in
20% of the moral values cases they heard (red + yellow = orange, so the red bar extends up
to 5).
48. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States, supra note 22, at 31.
49. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, supra note 24, at 103.
50. Cf. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief Justice of
the United States, supra note 22, at 227.
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Notes: Regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following
Equation 1 as described in the text, successively building the specification in the
manner indicated at the top of each column. Ideology measure is based on the
legislative record of the appointing group of politicians. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for p-value < 0.05 and * for pvalue < 0.10.
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B. Preliminary Investigation of Judicial Decisions
We now proceed to analyze the determinants of judicial
decisions. To do so, we will employ measures of judge religion and
judge ideology as described above, specifically using the common
space measure of judicial ideology based on the legislative record
of the appointing politicians. Table 3 shows the results of our
running Equation 1, our baseline specification, on the sample of all
cases and all judges. The first column includes only basic judge
characteristics (sex, race, age, years on the bench) and fixed effects
(decade, appeals circuit).51 Subsequent columns add ideology and
religion, with column 2 including ideology only, column 3
including religion only, and column 4 including both. Because this
is a linear probability model, the coefficients can be interpreted as
the effect of a characteristic, such as being female, on the likelihood
of entering a liberal vote. We see that female judges are 5
percentage points more likely to decide a case in a liberal direction,
while white judges are 5 percentage points less likely to decide a
case in a liberal direction.
Column 2 shows that judge ideology (as measured by the
legislative record of appointing politicians) does appear to predict
judicial decisions, with a one-point increase in judicial ideology
reducing likelihood of a liberal vote by 14 percentage points.
Recalling Figure 1 and the distribution of ideology, this means that,
comparing a judge at the conservative end of the distribution
(ideology of 0.5) with a judge at the liberal end (ideology of -0.5),
the likelihood of a liberal vote declines by 14 percentage points.
Given that about 48% of judge votes in the sample are liberal, this
is a substantial movement of nearly one-third of the mean. Hence,
consistent with the literature, we find that ideology’s influence on
judicial decisions is significant, both statistically and practically.
On the other hand, column 3 shows that religion, at least by
itself, does not appear to be an important determinant of judicial
decisions. The coefficients on each religious group (Catholic,
Jewish, or Other, with Protestant as the omitted base category) are
51. Only the coefficients of interest are shown in the table; fixed effects and coefficients
for age and years on the bench are omitted for clarity.
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all small and statistically insignificant. Moreover, including both
religion and ideology together in column 4 reveals little new
information: the coefficient on ideology is identical to that in
column 2, the coefficients on the religion indicator variables 52 have
changed slightly but insignificantly from those in column 3, and the
adjusted R-squared is virtually identical to that in column 2.
C. Different Case Types
Even if religion does not play a significant role across the broad
range of cases under analysis, might it matter more in a subset of
cases? Table 4 allows us to delve a bit deeper into this question by
looking separately at cases we have categorized as moral values
cases and comparing them to other cases. As noted previously, the
moral values category is comprised of cases involving abortion,
capital punishment, gay and lesbian rights, and obscenity. We have
focused on these kinds of cases because of the frequency with
which they are cast in religious and moral terms in public
discourse. The results in Table 4 reveal that everything we have
been considering—sex, race, ideology, religion—matters more in
these very cases.

52. An indicator or dummy variable indicates the presence or absence of the
characteristic, taking a value of 1 if the characteristic is present (e.g., the judge is Catholic) or
a value of 0 if the characteristic is absent (e.g., the judge is not Catholic).
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Notes: Regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following
Equation 1 for the large case category shown at the top of the column. Ideology
measure is based on the legislative record of the appointing group of politicians.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for
p-value < 0.05 and * for p-value < 0.10.
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Notably, ideology matters slightly more in moral values cases
compared to other cases: the main effect of ideology is a decline of
17 percentage points, rather than 14. Even more interestingly, we
now see some separation between the coefficients for the different
religion categories: Jewish judges are 10 percentage points more
likely to make a liberal decision than Protestant judges, while
Catholic judges are 5 percentage points less likely to do so (though
this last result is not statistically significant).53 In the non moral
values category of cases, ideology matters but religion is not
particularly important. So what accounts for the difference? If
judges are behaving differently in moral values cases, what we
would like to do is parse out what is influencing their behavior
—political
ideology,
religion,
other
moral/conscience
frameworks,54 or some combination. The fact that columns 2 and 3
look different—that religion matters in moral values cases but not
in others—suggests that religion is indeed guiding the decisionmaking of at least some judges in cases in which fundamental moral
values are under consideration.
D. Interactions Among Ideology, Religion, and Case Type
To fully understand judicial behavior in this context, we need
to be able to simultaneously examine the effects of and interactions
among religion, ideology, and case category. We do this by running
the fully saturated regression specification shown in Equation 2 and
interpreting it using the visual methodology described in
section III.D. Figure 7 employs the visual methodology to
investigate the roles of ideology and religion in different large case
categories: all case types in panel A, moral values cases in panel B,
and not moral values cases in panel C.55

53. The p-value for this coefficient is 0.19, meaning we can reject the null hypothesis
that this coefficient equals zero with 81% confidence.
54. For discussion of the distinction between religious and secular claims of
conscience, see René Reyes, Common Cause in the Culture Wars?, 27 J.L. & RELIGION 231 (2011);
René Reyes, The Fading Free Exercise Clause, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 725 (2011).
55. The ideology measure here is the measure we have used for most of our analysis
so far, the legislative record of appointing politicians.
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Consider panel A, representing results for all case types. All
judges show similar relationships between ideology and decisionmaking. There are some small but insignificant differences in slope
and position—Jewish judges show a slightly steeper slope, judges
of other religious identities are slightly more liberal—but overall
this is a story of homogeneity. A change in political ideology
from -0.5 (quite liberal) to +0.5 (quite conservative) yields
approximately a 12-percentage-point decline in the likelihood of a
liberal vote. The lines for different religions are so coincident as to
overlap substantially.
The results get much more exciting when we look at moral
values cases in panel B. Here, the slope for Protestant judges is very
steep, much steeper than it was in the general case categories and
much steeper than for Catholic judges. At the same time, Catholic
judges exhibit a mild slope and a very slight tendency to lean
conservative, with their average likelihood of a liberal vote at 38%.
While Protestants and Catholics were almost indistinguishable in
panel A, they are almost completely distinct in panel B. Something
different is happening in moral values cases for Catholics and
Protestants, particularly for judges with liberal political ideology.
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There is also something interesting going on with Jewish
judges. The slope for Jewish judges is as steep as that of Protestant
judges, so that for both groups moving from the liberal end (-0.5) to
the conservative end (0.5) yields a decline of approximately 20
percentage points in the likelihood of a liberal vote. This does not,
however, mean that Jewish and Protestant judges vote similarly:
the Jewish line is shifted up by more than 10 percentage points,
indicating a much higher likelihood that Jewish judges will
lean liberal, whatever their political ideology. Judges of other
religions and nonreligious judges exhibit a slightly sloped line that
is shifted upwards: they are only mildly ideological, but overall
relatively liberal.
Panel C, showing results for all of the cases that are not moral
values cases, is reminiscent of the more tame results of panel A.
Political ideology matters across the board, a bit more for some
religions, a bit less for others. Religion matters very little. It appears
that the interesting action is largely confined to cases in which
fundamental moral values are at stake. In those cases, and almost
exclusively in those cases, both religion and political ideology matter,
and political ideology matters differently for different religious
groups.
To better understand these dynamics, let us consider an
alternate description of how the results for moral values cases in
Figure 7B differ from the results for non moral values cases in Figure
7C. Focusing specifically on Protestants and Catholics, we observe
that the separation of Protestants and Catholics—from almost
identical in non moral values cases to quite different in moral
values cases—arises out of the combination of two movements.
One movement is that the Protestant line becomes steeper,
primarily by a movement downward of the conservative (right)
end. At the same time, the Catholic line becomes flatter, primarily
by a movement downward of the liberal (left) end, and the entire
line moves down.
This suggests several imperfect distillations of what we have
learned so far about patterns of jurisprudence in moral values cases
as revealed in our data:
(a) Protestant judges have tended to vote in accordance with
their political ideology, while Catholic judges have tended
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to vote relatively more conservatively regardless of their
political ideology.
(b) Liberal Jewish judges have tended to vote most liberally.
(c) Conservative Protestant judges have tended to vote most
conservatively.
E. Narrowing the Focus Further
We can deepen this analysis by breaking the cases out into three
rather than two large categories: moral values cases, rights cases,
and corporate or other cases. We do this in Figure 8. In moral values
cases, we again see steep slopes for Protestant judges and Jewish
judges, flatter slopes for Catholic judges and those of other religious
identities. With different slopes and different placements for the
different religions, religion seems to matter a good deal in cases in
which fundamental moral values are at issue—abortion,
homosexuality, obscenity, and capital punishment.

At the same time, in rights cases—affirmative action, ADA, sex
discrimination, Title VII, and the First Amendment—we see closer
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placements and slopes. These cases are less ideological, but
ideology still matters. Protestant and Catholic judges are almost
identical for these cases, with a moderate slope, while Jewish judges
and judges of other religious identities are almost identical with a
slightly steeper slope.
Comparison between the moral values and rights cases
suggests that the divergence between Catholics and Protestants
arises for moral values cases per se, in which Catholics are
relatively flatter and shifted down.56 This is a notable result.
Scholars have offered differing interpretations about the extent to
which Catholic teaching calls upon judges to seek conformity
between moral law and civil law,57 but our empirical results
indicate that Catholic judges are behaving differently in moral
values cases. Panel A shows that in such cases, even Catholic judges
who are otherwise liberal appear to substantially moderate those
liberal leanings and vote relatively conservatively, often more
conservatively than many ideologically conservative judges of
Jewish or other religious identities. At the same time, panel B
provides evidence rejecting the hypothesis that this is a broader
difference—i.e., that Catholic judges are simply more conservative
across the board. Panel B shows clearly that this behavior is specific
to moral values cases per se and is not evident in cases concerning
individual rights. In such cases, the voting behavior of Protestant
and Catholic judges is almost identical. We also see a closing of the
gap between Jewish judges and judges with other religious
identities, but this is accomplished mostly by a steepening for the
latter and a slight vertical shift for the former.
Lastly, panel C shows that religion and ideology are least
important in cases that we have classified as corporate and other.
Ideology matters some but not a great deal: the gap between
conservative and liberal is only 10 percentage points, on a very high
mean of 69% liberal votes. Religion matters very little, with only
Jewish judges distinguished as very slightly less likely to lean
liberal.

56. While the confidence intervals are large, the gaps between the lines are large
enough that they are still generally statistically significant.
57. See supra notes 16–20 and accompanying text.
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F. Robustness and Understanding
All of the above results are robust to numerous specification
tests. Crucially, the central results are robust to employing the
alternate ideology measure based on the judge’s campaign finance
contributions. As seen in Figure 2 (which was used as the example
for our visual methodology), the results for moral values cases are
qualitatively similar but somewhat amplified using this measure.
In Figure 2, we see a more substantial flattening of the line for
Catholic judges and an even larger steepening of the line for Jewish
judges. Given that this measure is more closely based on the
judge’s own political leanings—rather than those of his or her
nominators —it may not be surprising that the effects of ideology
are slightly amplified.
The results are also largely unchanged when including fixed
effects for individual case categories (the seventeen categories
listed in Table 1) or when including the few additional available
cases from the 1970s. A particularly ambitious robustness test is to
include fixed effects for each individual case (one for each of the 3000+
individual cases). This enables identification off of within-case
variation only, and yields empirical results which are qualitatively
similar but somewhat attenuated, as would be expected with the
inclusion of so many fixed effects.
The most interesting robustness test is running the entire
analysis using a probit specification rather than a linear probability
model. A probit is the econometrically appropriate specification for
a binary outcome variable, allowing for an underlying
mathematical structure in which the independent variables
(religion, ideology, etc.) affect a latent propensity to vote liberally,
and subsequently a liberal vote arises if that latent propensity
exceeds a certain threshold. These results are, again, qualitatively
similar, but probably more accurate in estimating the exact size of
each effect. They are shown in Table 5 and Figure 9.
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Notes: Probit regression of liberal vote on judge and case characteristics following
Equation 2 for moral values cases. Marginal effects are shown, evaluated at the
sample mean for ideology and at the appropriate group mean for each dummy
variable (i.e., the effect of “Catholic” is estimated with setting the dummy for
“Catholic” equal to 1 and the dummies for other religions equal to 0). Ideology
measure is based on the legislative record of the appointing group of politicians.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Significance is indicated by ** for p-value
< 0.05 and * for p-value < 0.10.
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Table 5 shows the marginal effects at the means for the probit
regression for moral values cases.58 We see the greater tendency of
Catholic judges to vote conservatively in moral values cases
reflected in the borderline significant -0.07 marginal effect of the
Catholic dummy variable59 and the dampened ideological behavior
of Catholic judges to vote conservatively in moral values cases
reflected in the +0.17 marginal effect of the interaction between the
Catholic dummy and ideology. The practical significance of these
is to reduce the likelihood of voting liberally by 7 percentage points
for all Catholics, and to flatten the slope of liberal vote likelihood
with respect to ideology from 25 percentage points for Protestants
to 8 (= 25 – 17) percentage points for Catholics. This is the same shift
and flattening we saw in the linear probability model and in Figures
7 and 8. We also see confirmation of the same effects for Jewish
judges: higher likelihood of liberal votes overall (a 12-percentagepoint main effect) and a slightly steeper slope.

58. As discussed at note 45 supra, reporting results of a probit regression is more
complex than simply reporting coefficients and standard errors. While the coefficient on an
independent variable represents its effect on the latent propensity for a “positive” outcome,
the marginal effect of an independent variable represents the effect of a one-unit change in
that variable on the predicted probability of a “positive” outcome. The marginal effect is
therefore more practically meaningful. However, since one must decide at what independent
variable values to calculate the marginal effects, the marginal effect is also more complicated
to report. One common choice is to report the marginal effects at the sample mean of all
independent variables, but this is not necessarily the correct strategy when the independent
variables include categorical (dummy) variables. In the present analysis, the marginal effect
of a dummy variable that is of interest is the change in the probability of a liberal vote that
results from changing that dummy variable from 0 to 1. We therefore calculate the marginal
effects of each religion other than Protestant at the margin of shifting from Protestant (our
base category) to that religion. For each religion, we calculate these for the two extremes of
ideology (liberal or conservative) and then average the two estimates. We do this both for
the effects of each religion per se and for the interaction effects of ideology with each religion.
These are reported in Table 5. We note, however, that marginal effects calculated in this more
careful manner are not significantly different from the simpler marginal effects calculated at
the sample mean. See GREENE, supra note 40, at 734–36.
59. The t-statistic for the Catholic dummy is 1.58, reflecting a p-value of 0.11. This
corresponds to an 89% confidence of rejecting the null hypothesis that the effect of
the Catholic dummy is zero, just shy of the standard 90% confidence threshold for
statistical significance.
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Figure 9 represents these results graphically, plotting the
predicted liberal vote share for each combination of the four
religion categories with the two extremes of ideology (liberal at -0.5
and conservative at +0.5). Comparing liberal and conservative
Protestant judges, there is a large gap of 25 percentage points in the
likelihood of voting liberally in moral values cases: 55% for
ideological liberals versus 30% for ideological conservatives.
However, this gap is much smaller, only 7 percentage points, for
Catholic judges: 39% for ideological liberals versus 32% for
ideological conservatives. Recalling our attention to both position
and slope, we also note that the Catholic judges are voting more
conservatively, whatever their political ideology. At a predicted liberal
vote share of 39%, even ideologically liberal Catholic judges are
voting more conservatively in moral values cases than ideologically
conservative Jewish judges, and they are voting quite similarly to
ideologically conservative Protestant judges.
We also confirm that Jewish judges are more liberal overall and
that their gap is quite large. Further analysis reveals that this
importance of ideology for Jewish judges in moral values cases is
primarily driven by the single case category of capital punishment,
in which Jewish judges appear to be very liberal and very
ideological. Finally, judges of other religious identities are
moderate and less ideological, with the smallest gap.
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V. AN IDENTIFIABLY CATHOLIC JURISPRUDENCE?
We have now seen that, in cases in which fundamental moral
values are at stake, and almost exclusively in those cases, both
religion and ideology matter, and ideology matters differently for
different religious groups. We have also seen that Catholics in
particular appear to vote relatively conservatively in moral values
cases regardless of their political ideology. This raises the question
of whether Catholic religious ideology may be to some extent
displacing political ideology in informing jurisprudence when
fundamental moral values are at issue.
A notable problem with interpreting the results in this way is
that Catholic religious teaching is not politically conservative as
applied to all moral values cases. The issue of capital punishment
is the most important example. Since 1997, the Catechism of the
Catholic Church has cast doubt on the death penalty by teaching
that “cases in which the execution of the offender is an absolute
necessity ‘are very rare, if not practically nonexistent.’”60 Pope
Francis has recently revised the text to clarify that “the death
penalty is inadmissible because it is an attack on the inviolability
and dignity of the person.”61 The politically liberal nature of this
church teaching stands in contrast to the politically conservative
tenor of church teaching on abortion and same-sex marriage. The
ultimate test of the hypothesis that there exists an identifiably
Catholic jurisprudential pattern of decision-making would
therefore be whether the effects are different in the subcategories of
moral values cases in a manner consistent with Catholic doctrine.
While our results show a conservative voting trend among Catholic
judges in moral values cases overall, a “reverse” result in death
penalty cases would be an important additional piece of evidence.
Unfortunately, testing this hypothesis appears to be beyond the
capacity of our data—cutting the cases by religion, ideology, and
small subcategory substantially reduces statistical power to

60. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶ 2267 (2d ed. 1997).
61. Gerard O’Connell, Pope Francis Revises Catechism, Teaches that Death Penalty Is

‘Inadmissible,’ AMERICA (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2018/08
/02/pope-francis-revises-catechism-teaches-death-penalty-inadmissible. See also Elisabetta
Povoledo & Laurie Goodstein, Pope Francis Declares Death Penalty Unacceptable in All Cases,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/world/europe/pope
-death-penalty.html.
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distinguish among alternate hypotheses. The standard errors and
confidence intervals get very large, and we are therefore unable to
either accept or reject the hypothesis of a “Catholic jurisprudence.”
CONCLUSION
Interest in the religious identification of federal judges is
longstanding and enduring. The recent nomination of Brett
Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court has once again prompted public
discussion and debate about the relationship between religion and
judicial decision-making and has even given rise to warnings of
anti-Catholic bigotry.62 But while the religious commitments of
judges may generate abiding public attention, the foregoing
analysis suggests that these commitments may not have nearly as
much influence on judicial behavior as is sometimes assumed. In
most of the cases we have studied, religious identification plays
little if any role in influencing a judge’s jurisprudence. This
suggests that for most nominees to the federal bench, religious
affiliation by itself is of minimal value for predicting how they will
decide the cases that come before them. Political ideology plays an
important role in nearly all categories of cases, but religion
generally does not.
This is not to say that religion has proven to be irrelevant in
judicial decision-making. To the contrary, we have seen that both
religious ideology and political ideology matter in moral values
cases—the very cases that many people care about most deeply.
These cases give rise to a divergence in behavior between Catholic
and Protestant judges in which Catholic judges seem to be voting
relatively conservatively regardless of their political ideology,
while Protestant judges seem to be voting liberally or
conservatively in line with their political ideology. We also
document relatively liberal voting behavior of Jewish judges in
moral values cases—particularly those involving capital
62. See, e.g., James S. Robbins, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Will Face AntiCatholic Bigotry—Yes, Bigotry, USA TODAY (July 10, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com
/story/opinion/2018/07/10/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-trump-anti-catholic
-bigotry-column/770712002/; Michael S. Rosenwald, Judge Brett Kavanaugh—a Catholic
—Faces a Historical Struggle Between Canon and Constitutional Law, WASH. POST (July 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2018/07/08/catholics-on-the
-court-the-historic-struggle-between-canon-and-constitutional-law/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.6ba46d92e69a.
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punishment—and relatively nonideological behavior of judges of
other religious identities. These complex interaction effects of
religion and political ideology on a judge’s jurisprudence are
both statistically and practically significant: even politically liberal
Catholic judges are voting more conservatively in moral values
cases than politically conservative Jewish judges, and they are
voting quite similarly to politically conservative Protestant
judges. The religion of a judge therefore does appear to be
systematically connected to his or her jurisprudence in at least
some circumstances.
The larger and most important implication of our study may
thus be to confirm that judicial decision-making in the federal
courts has not simply been an exercise in applying text and
precedent; it has been a process in which ideology of various kinds
has sometimes played an important role. This suggests in turn that
members of the public and of the U.S. Senate should continue to
raise questions about judicial nominees’ views about contested
constitutional questions touching upon fundamental rights. To ask
such questions is not to manifest anti-religious bias, but rather to
recognize that judging has proven to be a far more ideologically
complex task than many nominees have suggested.
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